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Mucking Out the Stalls: How KRS § 230.357
Promises to Change Custom and Facilitate
Economic Efficiency in the Horse Industry
R. Kelley Rosenbaum1
INTRODUCTION

Agency relationships permeate the horse industry; however, those in the
business have not always followed the common-law agency principles of
loyalty and good faith. Recently, the horse industry has seen numerous lawsuits filed across the country, each sharing the same theme of dual agency
and undisclosed payments in the sale of horses.' In response to this growing problem, the Kentucky legislature enacted KRS § 230.357, 3 which defines dual agency as any person acting as an agent for both the purchaser
and the seller, without full disclosure of such, in a transaction involving a
sale, purchase, or transfer of an interest in a horse used for racing or showing.4 It also provides that an undisclosed payment or "kickback" occurs
when "a person acting as an agent for either a purchaser or a seller or acting
as a dual agent in a transaction involving the sale, purchase, or transfer of
an equine[,] ... receive[s] compensation, fees, a gratuity, or any other item
of value in excess of five hundred dollars ($500) and related directly or
indirectly to such transaction from an individual ... other than an agent's
principal" without the principal's knowledge and written consent.5

I J.D. expected 2oo8, University of Kentucky College of Law; B.A., Miami University
(Oxford, Ohio), 2004.
2 James Mclngvale, furniture tycoon and thoroughbred owner, filed suit against
thoroughbred trainer Bob Baffert and agents J.B. McKathan and Kevin McKathan, alleging
the three received secret commissions and kickbacks while acting as agents and advisors to
Mclngvale. The lawsuit was filed in U.S. District Court in Texas in September, 2oo6. See Ryan
Conley, et al., Mclnvgale Suit ChargesKickbacks to Trainerand Agents, BLOODHORSE.COM, Sept. 8,
2006, http://news.bloodhorse.com/viewstory.asp?id=35240. Thoroughbred owner Jess Jackson
of Kendall-Jackson Wines filed suit in 2oo6 against various entities and individuals, alleging
that his advisors took payments of which he was unaware. See Janet Patton & Mary Meehan,
Shady DealingHas Been Hardto Rein In: HorseIndustry Reacts to Lawsuit, LEXINGTON HERALDLEADER, Mar. 26, 2oo6, at AI.
3 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 230.357 (West 2006) (hereinafter "the Act").
4 Id. § 230.357(3).
5 Id. § 230.357(4).
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This recent enactment by the Kentucky legislature does not represent
the first efforts to combat problems associated with dual agency. These
practices have plagued the horse business for many years,6 and professional
organizations have attempted, without legislative intervention, to remedy
the problem. 7 The British Jockey Club, for example, set forth its Code of
Practice in July of 2004.8 Unlike the United States Jockey Club, the British organization has the power to ban individuals from racetracks and other
licensed grounds.9 This power enables the British Jockey Club to enforce
its Code provisions. In 2005, the Thoroughbred Owners and Breeders Association (TOBA), an American organization, created the Sales Integrity
Task Force, which promulgated a Code of Ethics for Thoroughbred Auctions.10 The TOBA code encourages buyers to use a written disclosure
agreement and states that dual agency without disclosure to all parties is
inherently fraudulent." I Although TOBA experienced success in developing the Code, its implementation proved more difficult due to the lack of a
viable enforcement mechanism. American professional organizations, unlike their British counterparts, have no centralized power to impose penalties for violations of their codes of ethics. L
In January of 2006, the Horse Owners Protective Association (HOPA),
was formed to address fraudulent business practices in the horse industry.
Later that year, HOPA successfully urged the Kentucky legislature to enact
KRS § 230.257.13 The Act carries with it the promise to clean up the horse

6 "You disclose who you represent. That's the issue and has been the issue for so long..
The problem has been people haven't been willing to do that. [I]t's been [this way] since
the beginning of the horse trading business...." Patton & Meehan, supra note 2 (statement
by Headly Bell, President of Nicoma Bloodstock). "For many years, this infrequent, but
abhorrent practice [of dual agency without disclosure] has received publicity from time to
time .... " CODE OF ETHICS FOR THOROUGHBRED AUCTIONS, at Art. II, (Thoroughbred Owners
and Breeders Association (TOBA) 2oo5), availableat http://www.salesintegrity.orgldownloads/
Code-ofEthics2.pdf.
7 An example of this intervention includes the promulgation of the Thoroughbred
Owners and Breeders Association's Code of Ethics. TOBA Code of Ethics, supra note 6. In
addition, the United States Equestrian Foundation has considered creating a task force that
would develop a dispute resolution forum to address disputes arising from the ownership of a
horse, including any aspect of the sale of a horse.
8 See Mark Popham, 'Code of Practice' Implemented in Great Britain, BLOODHORSE.COM,
July 6, 2004, http://www.bloodhorse.com/articleindex/article.asp?id=2 3284. For a copy of

the British Code of Practice, see THE

BLOOD STOCK INDUSTRY CODE OF PRACTICE

(British

Horseracing Board et. al. 2oo4), http://britishhorseracing.com/images/owning-breedingITheBloodstockIndustryCode of Practice.pdf.

9

POPHAM,

supra note 8.

iO TOBA Code of Ethics, supra note 6.
I I d. at Art. II.
12 See Dan Liebman & Deirdre B. Biles, Code ofEthicsforAuctionsAnnounced,BLOODHORSE.
COM, Dec. 16, 2004, http://www.bloodhorse.com/articleindex/article.asp?id=258 3 1.
13 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 230.357 (West 2oo6).

2006-20071

ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY IN THE HORSE INDUSTRY

999

industry by clearly stating that undisclosed dual agency and kickbacks are
per se illegal.' 4 The Act imposes treble damages and allows the prevailing party to recover "costs of the suit, reasonable litigation expenses, and
attorney's fees."'" HOPA sponsored the Act in hopes that the legislation
would make it easier to bring claims of this type and to encourage members
of the bar to take these cases. 16 Generally, the horse industry has reacted
positively to the legislation. 7
This Note evaluates the likely impact that the Act will have on the
horse industry in light of the pre-existing agency law. Part I provides an
overview of agency law in Kentucky prior to the passage of the Act. Specifically, it examines Kentucky case law, the Restatement (Second) of Agenly,
and Kentucky statutes that comprised the majority of agency law before
passage of the Act. Part II addresses the specific features of the Act and
how these features contribute to the pre-existing law. This section further
compares the Act to similar efforts by other states' legislatures, specifically,
the California Business and Professions Code § 19525. Finally, Part III
presents a brief economic analysis of the law and discusses how the Act
affects an individual's incentives in a typical horse transaction.
I.

AGENCY LAW IN KENTUCKY

As

IT PERTAINS

"DUAL AGENCY" IN THE SALE OF HORSES'

To

8

Consider the prototypical private horse sale with four main players: the
buyer, the buyer's agent, the seller, and the seller's agent. Imagine that the
buyer wants to buy a thoroughbred named Silver Horse, that recently won

14 Id. §§ 230-357(3)-(4).

15 Id. § 230.357(6).
16 Jess Jackson, Panel Discussion during the University of Kentucky CLE Equine Law
Seminar (Mar. 3-4, 2006) (electronic recording on file with author).
17 Deirdre

B.

Biles, Thoroughbred Industry Reacts Positively to Jackson Legislation,

BLOODHORSE.COM,Jan. 27, 2oo6, http://www.bloodhorse.com/articleindex/article.asp?id=3 1943.
Not everyone in the industry, however, shares the same positive sentiments regarding the
legislation. For example, former Kentucky Governor Brereton Jones, owner of Airdrie Stud,
defended the right to pay commissions when business warrants. Governor Jones stated, "as
a general rule, we don't pay commissions .... There have been some paid when I think
they are earned and when I think it's good business to do so. The great thing about the
free enterprise system is we have the right to invest and spend our money as is best for
our business. That doesn't mean you have the right to dual agency or conspire to defraud
somebody. We haven't done that." Ray Paulick, JonesDefends Payment of Commissions to Former
Jackson Advisor, BLOODHORSE.COM, Mar. 17 , 2oo6, http://www.bloodhorse.com/articleindex/
article.asp?id-32618 (quote from B. Jones).
18 See generallyJoel B. Turner, Liability ofAgent(s) ofBuyerofBloodstockfor Taking Undisclosed
Kickbacks from Sellers or Consignors,in 21ST ANNUAL NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON EQUINE LAW §
E(a) (Univ. of Ky. College of Law, Office of Continuing Legal Education, 2006). This article
serves as a general guide to common law agency law in Kentucky and provided many of the
resources utlilized in Part I of this Note.
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a stakes race. Since the buyer knows little about the horse industry, he
employs an agent, presumably with expertise in the thoroughbred industry,
to negotiate the purchase of Silver Horse. Assume each agent will receive a
commission at the conclusion of the sale from her principal. Typically, this
commission ranges between five and ten percent of the purchase price of
the horse. 19Once the parties reach an agreement on the sale price of Silver
Horse, the buyer's agent should receive the percentage of the purchase
price from the buyer, and the seller's agent should receive her percentage
of the purchase price from the seller. This simple transaction implicates
an abundance of legal issues and fiduciary duties. This section provides a
general overview of law that was in place prior to the passage of the Act and
the legal problems that an agent could face in the event that her conduct
conflicts with the legal rules discussed in this section.
A. The Basics: FiduciaryDuties under Hoge and the Restatement
The legal rules set forth in Hoge v. Kentucky River Coal Co. 0 govern the relationship between a principal and his agent in Kentucky. The legal relationship between a principal and an agent is one based in contract law, where
the agent is under an obligation to perform a service for the principal in
a particular business enterprise.2" The relationship between an agent and
a principal, however, extends beyond basic contract law to that of a fiduciary.22 As such, certain duties are owed to the principal, even if they are
not specifically provided for in the contract.
According to the Hoge court, an agent is required to be loyal and faithful
to the interests of her principal. 3 Therefore, the agent cannot act in any
manner that would be in opposition to the interests of her principal.2 4 In
addition, she may not use the information acquired through her services
for personal gain or in any manner that will cause harm to her principal.2 5
Finally, the agent may not take profits, which exceed the agreed compensation for her services.2 6 Any unauthorized profits must be turned over to the
principal, even if the principal has not suffered any loss as a result of her

19 See Andrew Havens, Findingthe "Right Horse:" The Rol ofthe Bloodstock Agent, OwNER'S

available at www.toconline.com/communication/archives-buying.php
Apr. 18, 2007).
2o Hoge v. Ky. River Coal Co., 287 S.W. 226 (Ky. 1926).
CIRCLE,

21

Id. at 227.

22

Id. at zz8.

23

Id. at 227.
Id.

24

25 Id.
26

Id.

(last visited
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agent's profits.2 7 The court also stated that an agent's violation of fiduciary
duties is an act against public policy."8
The fiduciary duties announced in Hoge directly correlate with provisions in the Restatement (Second) of Agency. The general duty of loyalty announced in the Restatement (Second) ofAgeny § 387 provides that in all matters relating to the agency, an agent is to act for the benefit of his principal
alone. 9 This is consistent with the basic tenet announced in Hoge, that an
agent must be loyal and act in good faith in all matters regarding his agency.3" The Restatement (Second) ofAgency § 391 also speaks directly to the pro31
hibition against agents acting adversely to the interests of their principals.
This section provides that an agent may not act on behalf of any adverse
party without his principal's knowledge.32 In an illustration to section 391, a
principal employs an agent to sell his house with a commission of five percent to go to the agent.3 3 The buyer has employed the same agent to find
a house for him.m The principal is unaware of the agent's other relationship.3" As one might imagine, the agent urges the principal to sell the house
to the buyer at the price offered. The agent has breached his duty to the
principal. 36 This situation is directly applicable to our hypothetical transaction. If the prospective buyer of Silver Horse also employed the seller's
agent without the seller's knowledge, the seller's agent will have breached
her duty of loyalty to the seller under the rules of both the Restatement and
Hoge.
The Hoge court also stated that an agent may not use or disclose information for personal gain or to the detriment of his principal. 37 This rule
is supported by the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 395, which forbids an
agent from disclosing confidential information when disclosure would be
for her own gain, when the disclosure is "in competition" with her duties to
27 Id.

28 Id. at 228.
29 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (1958).
30 Hoge, 287 S.W. at 228.
31 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 391 (1958).
32 Id.

33
P employs A to find a purchaser of his house at the highest obtainable price,
A to have a commission of 5 percent. Unknown to P, A has been employed by T to
find a suitable house for him at the lowest possible price. A introduces P to T and,
without disclosing his relations with T, urges P to sell at the price offered by T This
is a breach of duty to P.
Id. at cmt. d, illus. 2.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Hoge v. Ky. River Coal Co., 287 S.W. 226, 227 (Ky. 1926).
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her principal, or when the disclosure would be "to the injury of [her] principal."3 This situation might arise in any number of ways in the horse business. For example, assume that the seller's agent knows that the seller had
poor sales figures at the Keeneland September yearling sale. As a result, the
seller is unable to make his loan payments to the bank and is willing to take
a lower price for Silver Horse. Further, assume that seller's agent discloses
this information to the buyer or buyer's agent in exchange for a secret commission payable to him upon the closing of the sale for Silver Horse at a
reduced price. This is a clear breach of fiduciary duties under both Hoge
and the Restatement.
The Hoge court also stated that an agent may not take profits beyond
the compensation agreed upon between himself and his principal and must
account for all profits to his principal.3 9 Similarly, the Restatement (Second) of
Agency § 388 provides that when an agent makes a profit in connection with
his employment as an agent he must give that profit to his principal.4 Accordingly, if the buyer's agent receives any money in connection with the
sale of Silver Horse from anyone
other than the buyer, he is obligated to
4
pay that money to his principal. '
The major defense available to an agent who has taken an undisclosed
commission under the Restatement is the defense of custom. The Restatement provides that if a custom exists whereby an agent can act for an adverse party then the agent will not violate the duty of loyalty.4 The custom
must be sufficiently widespread so that a principal would be aware of its
existence. 43 However, when an agent is acting for two principals, "the agent
is subject to the duty of fair dealing stated in Section 392."44

38 RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
39 Hoge, 287 S.W at 227.

OF AGENCY

§ 395 (1958).

40 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 388 (1958).
41 See id. at cmt. a.
42

Id. § 391 cmt. a.

Effect of custom. The terms of employment may give a privilege to the agent
to act for adverse parties, and such terms may be shown by a prior course of dealing
between the principal and agent or by custom of which the principal should be aware.
A custom that an agent can properly act for an adverse party is usually so unreasonable
that, in the absence of knowledge by the principal, he is not affected by it if the agent
is to exercise any discretion or is employed to give advice to the principal.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
43 Id.
44 Id. Section 392 provides the following:
An agent who, to the knowledge of two principals, acts for both of them in a
transaction between them, has a duty to act with fairness to each and to disclose to
each all facts which he knows or should know would reasonably affect the judgment
of each in permitting such dual agency, except as to a principal who has manifested
that he knows such facts or does not care to know them.
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Custom may serve as a potential defense to suits arising from horse
sales. Agents and sellers might claim that undisclosed payments and dual
agency are common in the sale of horses. Under the Restatement, if it were
a custom in the horse industry, a court could conceivably allow an agent to
act for adverse parties without violating the duty of loyalty. However, the
Restatement does not instill much confidence in the viability of this defense.
The comments to section 391 proclaim that "a custom that an agent can
properly act for an adverse party is usually so unreasonable that, in the
absence of knowledge by the principal, [the principal] is not affected by
it ....,,45
These comments do not bode well for the defense of custom to
undisclosed dual agency in the horse business.
Finally, although not specifically addressed in Hoge, third parties who
interfere with a principal/agent relationship are in violation of sections 313
and 312 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency. 6 Section 313 states that any
party to a transaction who knowingly employs the agent of the other party
to the transaction to act on his behalf in such transaction is liable to the
other principal. 47 The safe harbor provision allows that the third party to escape liability if he "reasonably believes" that the other principal has agreed
to the arrangement. 48 In addition to subjecting third parties who hire the
agent of another to liability, section 312 envisions a situation where, without
employing another's agent as one's own agent, one intentionally "cause[s]
or assist[s]" an agent to violate his fiduciary duties to his principal. 49 In
0
that instance, the violating party would be liable to the principal.5 These
provisions work together with the election of remedies provision, Restatement (Second) of Agency § 407,51 which states that even though a principal
has recovered from a third party, the principal may still pursue the agent
to retrieve the profit he individually received. Applying these principles to
the prototype, assume the seller has given a secret kickback to the buyer's
agent to get a favorable price for Silver Horse. The buyer can rescind the
contract and recover from the seller the purchase price, or he can sue the
seller for damages."2 Furthermore, the buyer may always recover from the
buyer's agent the amount of the kickback. 3 In the event that the seller's
agent had been the one who gave the secret kickback to the buyer's agent,

Id. § 392,
45 Id.§391 cmt.a.
46 Id.§§ 312-13.
47 Id. § 313 (I).
48 Id.
49 Id. § 407.
50 Id.§ 312.
51 Id.§ 407.
52 Id.§ 4070).

53 Id. at cmt. on subsection 2.
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the seller would still be liable since principals are generally liable for the
5 4
acts of their agents.
B. The GeneralProhibitionAgainstDualAgency and its Exception
Kentucky courts have firmly established that the practice of dual agency,
whereby an agent simultaneously represents both the buyer and seller, constitutes a breach of fiduciary duties. Over one hundred years ago, in Lloydv.
Colston &Moore, Kentucky's highest court ruled that an agent representing
the seller could not become an agent representing the buyer in the same
transaction.5" In Lloyd, a real estate agent endeavored to represent both the
buyer and the seller in the exchange of a drug store for vacant lots. 5 6 In the
court's opinion, since the object of each agent on either side of the transaction was to obtain the best bargain for their principal the "temptation to
violate [the agent's] duty to one or both is too great." 7 Clearly, the prohibition against dual agency contained in the Act is not a radical new idea.
Beasley v. Trontzss clarified the general prohibition against dual agency
by stating that one could become an agent for both buyer and seller if both
parties were aware of and consented to the arrangement. 9 Beasley is the
only published Kentucky case that deals specifically with undisclosed dual
agency in the sale of a horse. In that case, a seller employed a bloodstock
agent6° to find a buyer for a mare and foal. 6' The buyer had a pre-existing
agency relationship with the bloodstock agent, and the agent refused to
reveal the identity of the buyer to the seller.61 While the agent admitted
that he was acting as an agent for both parties, he still considered himself
to be "doing a fair job for both of them. '63 Nevertheless, the court stated
that if the jury found that the agent had simultaneously acted for both the
buyer and the seller, the seller would be entitled judgment as a matter of

54 Id. § 265(I) ("A master or other principal is subject to liability for torts which result from
reliance upon, or belief in, statements or other conduct within an agent's apparent authority.");
see also Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Gruenberger, 477 S.W 2d 503, 505 (Ky. 1972).
55 Lloyd v. Colston & Moore, 68 Ky. (5 Bush) 587, 588 (1869).
56 See generally id.
57 Id.
58 Beasley v. Trontz, 677 S.W.2d 891 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).
59 Id. at 894.
6o A bloodstock agent "[mlay be an expert in breeding, a trainer, or anyone the buyer
chooses to act on his behalf. Some work primarily for one buyer; others represent several
clients.... Acting in a private sale, the agent finds potential purchasers and makes an offer.
He may be paid a fee, usually 5 percent from the buyer." Janet Patton, Anatomy ofa Horse Sale,
LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Mar. 26, 2oo6, at Ai.
61 Beasley, 677 S.W2d at 892.
6z Id. at 894.
63 Id.
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law.' The court further clarified that the seller's agent need not receive any
commission from the buyer to be liable to the seller for breach of fiduciary
duties because it was a breach of his fiduciary duties to represent another
party in the same transaction without his principal's knowledge. 6 By obtaining written consent to the arrangement from both parties, the entirety
of any agent's problem in situations such as these can be resolved.
C. Fraudin the Sale of Horses
In addition to the remedies of rescission and restitution available to principals who have fallen victim to undisclosed dual agency, a principal may
seek punitive damages for fraud. 66 To sustain a claim of fraud a plaintiff
must prove all its elements by clear and convincing proof.67 The elements
were set out by the court in Keck v. Wacker. According to Keck, a plaintiff
must first demonstrate that the defendant made a material misrepresentation with knowledge or recklessness as to its falsity. Second, the plaintiff
must establish that the misrepresentation was false. Third, the statement
must have been intentionally made to cause the other party to act. Fourth,
the plaintiff must have acted in reliance on the statement. Lastly, the statement must have harmed him. 68 The court also stated that in order to warrant punitive damages, the statement must be made "willfully, maliciously,
wantonly, or oppressively," and "the conduct must be outrageous. ' 69 Interestingly, the Keck court stated that even if the agent's acts were fraudulent
in selling the mare, the seller might not be liable for punitive damages
unless he had taken part in the acts or had been negligent or careless in employing his agent.7" This suggests a limit on the basic rule found in the Restatement (Second) ofAgency § 265, which declares that a principal is liable for
the acts of his agent done while acting within the agent's apparent authority.7 Therefore, it is unlikely that a buyer who has relied on a fraudulent
statement by a seller's agent will be able to recover punitive damages from
the seller himself, unless the buyer can prove that the seller participated in
the fraud or was negligent in his employment of the agent.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals upheld an award of punitive damages
in Chernick v. Fasig-Tipton,Kentucky, Inc.,7" in which a mare was sold at auc64 Id.
65 Id.
66 See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 355.2-72 1 (West 2oo6); Keck v. Wacker, 413 E Supp. 1377,
1383-84 (E.D. Ky. 1976).

67 Keck, 413 F.Supp. at 1383.
68 Id.; see also Keeneland Ass'n, Inc. v. Earner, 830 E Supp. 974 (E.D. Ky. 1993).
69 Keck, 414 E Supp. at 1383-84.
70 Id. at 1384.
7 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § z65 (1958).
72 Chernick v. Fasig-Tipton Ky., Inc., 703 S.W.zd 885 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).
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tion without the sellers disclosing the vital fact that she had slipped (spontaneously aborted)73 twins prior to the sale and was most likely unfit for
breeding." The court found that because the sellers had been aware for
many months before the sale that the mare had this defect, "which made
her unsound for the purposes of breeding," an award of punitive damages
was appropriate." The failure to disclose this information amounted to a
deliberate misrepresentation regarding the mare.7 6 Furthermore, because
the auction's sales catalog contained an affirmative warranty that the status
of the mare was complete and truthful, the sellers had an affirmative duty
to disclose this mare's defect.7
Chernick provides a useful example of the type of egregious acts that are
necessary to prove fraud. If the buyer of Silver Horse is unaware that his
agent is also acting as an agent for the seller, the buyer should be able to
sustain a claim for fraud against the agent because a material fact about the
sale-the dual agency-was not disclosed to him.78 The Act requires disclosure of not only the dual agency arrangement but also of the kickbacks
or any kind of payment received from anyone other than the agent's principal.79 Thus, the Act confers an affirmative duty to disclose these agreements to the agent's principal. As a result, a claim for fraud in these situations is more likely to be successful.
Additionally, the Chernick court discussed the potential liability of the
sales company, Fasig-Tipton, despite the fact that the plaintiff did not assert a claim against the auction company.80 The court established the auction company's fiduciary duties toward the buyer, holding that Fasig-Tipton
had a fiduciary duty to use ordinary care "to ensure that its catalog and/or
announcements were as accurate and comprehensive as possible."'" The
court continued, "[t]he conduct of one of the Commonwealth's foremost
consignors of breeding stock is not to be reviewed at a level lower than that
of strict scrutiny. ' 8 Thus, the court will impose this limited fiduciary duty
on auction companies in the horse business. The court recognized that an
73 Id. at 885.
74 Id. at 888-89.
75 Id. at 888.
76 Id. at 889.
77 The presence or absence of a warranty may change the outcome of a fraud case. The
result differed in Cohen v. North Ridge Farms,Inc., 712 ESupp. 1265 (E.D. Ky. 1989), where the
alleged defect of the yearling was not one listed in the Conditions of Sale warranty and was
specifically disclaimed "as is." The buyer was on notice that he was buying the yearling "as is"
and therefore had no fraud claim. Id. at 1272.
78 Joel B. Turner, Liability ofAgent(s) of Buyer of Bloodstockfor Taking Undisclosed Kickbacks
from Sellers or Consignors, UNIV. OF Ky. EQUINE LAw SEMINAR ca-7 (2006).
79 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN § 230.357(3), (4) (West 2oo6).
80 Chernick, 703 S.W.2d 885, 890.

8i Id.
82 Id.
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important public policy issue is in play whenever a lawsuit involves the
horse industry. Although this Note addresses only private sales of horses,
Kentucky law also imposes certain fiduciary duties upon auction companies, in addition to those imposed upon agents and their principals."
D. Kentucky Statutes RegardingCommercialBribes andConspiracy
Another legal tool available to a principal harmed by his agent's acts is to
84
seek civil liability for violation of criminal bribery and conspiracy statutes.
Pursuant to KRS § 518.020, commercial bribery occurs when a person gives
any benefit to an agent without the consent of the principal with the intent
to influence the agent to act in a way that is not in his principal's best interest or in a way that is a breach of the agent's fiduciary duties.85 Under KRS
§ 518.030, an agent will be liable for receiving a commercial bribe if he
receives or intends to receive any benefit from a third party with the agreement that he will act in a manner that is inconsistent with his fiduciary
86
duties or in a manner that is harmful to his principal.
Applying these rules to the prototype, a commercial bribe is accomplished if the buyer's agent agrees (without the buyer's knowledge) to accept payment from the seller's agent in exchange for convincing the buyer
to pay an unfair and high price for Silver Horse. In this instance, the buyer's
agent would be liable to the buyer under KRS § 518.030 for losses caused
by the agent in receiving a commercial bribe. Seller and seller's agent
would be liable to the buyer under KRS § 518.020 for offering the bribe to
the buyer's agent with the intent to cause him to violate his fiduciary duties.
The perpetration of a commercial bribe leaves the seller, the seller's
agent, and the buyer's agent liable to the buyer under the Kentucky conspiracy statute, KRS § 506.040. The statute provides that any person who
acts with the intent to promote or facilitate a crime is guilty of criminal
conspiracy if "he agrees with one or more persons that at least one of them
will engage in conduct constituting a crime ... or agrees to aid ... persons in
the planning or commission of that crime ....
"87 In the example above, the

buyer's agent, the seller, and the seller's agent would be liable for damages

83 See also Keeneland Ass'n, Inc. v. Earner, 830 F. Supp. 974, 985-86 (E.D. Ky. 1993)
(affirming the Chernick rule and stating that is the limit on the duties to the potential buyers
at auction sales).
84 "[A] person injured by the violation of any statute may recover from the offender
such damages as he sustained by reason of the violation." Ky REV. STAT. ANN. § 446.070 (West
2004).
85 Id. § 5 18.020(l) (West 2oo6).

86 Id.§ 518.o3o.
87 Id. § 5o6.040()(a)-(b).
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caused by their conspiracy to commit a commercial bribe, since Kentucky
allows civil liability for violation of any statute.88
Kentucky law provides various other remedies exclusive of the Act for
violation of fiduciary duties. The Restatement (Second) of Agency sets forth
various rules that govern the fiduciary relationship between a principal and
her agent.8 9 Kentucky courts have long held that a fiduciary relationship
exists within an agency relationship,9 and Kentucky decisions 91 correlate
with the Restatement rules. 92 A buyer or seller victimized by undisclosed
kickbacks can sue for punitive damages if the elements of fraud are present.93 Finally, victims of the commercial bribery statutes 94 and conspiracy
statute 95 may pursue the imposition of civil liability.

II.

THE IMPACT OF THE ACT ON AGENCY LAW IN KENTUCKY

A. CaliforniaBusiness andProfessions Code § 19525:A Step Beyond the Act
The Act is based on California Business and Professions Code § 19525,%
which was enacted in 1994 and which states in pertinent part that no person can receive a commission "connect[ed] with the sale ...of a racehorse.
..unless the purchaser and the seller have agreed in writing to the payment
....
,9If a person receives a commission in violation of section 19525, the
penalty is treble damages to the injured person. 98 The law also requires a
written bill of sale in any transaction involving a racehorse. 99
Several aspects of the California legislation differ from the Act, with
one dramatic difference stemming from California's licensing requirement
of agents involved in the horse industry.100 Violation of section 19525 may
88 Id. § 446.070 (West 1974); see Big Rivers Elec. Corp. v. Thorpe, 921 E Supp. 460, 462
(W.D. Ky. 1996) (stating that Kentucky law provides a civil cause of action for those injured by
a violation of the criminal bribery statute).
89 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 391,392,388,381, 280 (1958).
9o See Hoge v. Ky. River Coal Co., 287 S.W. 226, 227-28 (Ky. 1926).
91 Id.
92 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY 99 387, 391, 395, 388 (1958) (enunciating some of
the general duties of an agent to his principal discussed in Part I of this Note).
93 See Keck v. Wacker, 413 E Supp. 1377 (E.D. Ky. 1976) (suit for fraud); Chernick v.
Fasig-Tipton Kentucky, Inc., 703 S.W.2d 885 (Ky. Ct.App. 1986) (same).
94 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 518.020 (West 2oo6); id. § 5 18.o3o.
o
95 Id. § 446.o7o (imposing civil liability for criminal violations); id. § 5o6.o4 (imposing
civil liability for criminal conspiracy violations).
96 Jess Jackson, Panel Discussion during the University of Kentucky CLE Equine Law
Seminar (Mar. 3-4, 2oo6) (electronic recording on file with author).
97 CAL. Bus. &PROF. CODE § 19525 (West 2OO6).
98 Id.
99 Id
ioo Any person who has anything to do with the racing of horses, including horse owners,

2006-2007]

ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY IN THE HORSE INDUSTRY

1009

result in a suspension or revocation of the violator's license. 10' Kentucky,
however, does not require licensing of bloodstock agents, so there is no
parallel penalty in the Act. HOPA, the main group lobbying for the Act, has
placed licensing agents in the horse business among its new goals. 02
More important than the licensing of agents is the requirement in section 19525 that no fee, commission, gratuity, or any form of compensation
be received unless the purchaser and the seller have agreed in writing to
such a payment. 103 The Act only requires that any payment over five hundred dollars received from anyone other than the agent's principal be dis4
closed in writing and consented to in writing by the agent's principal.'
California's legislation goes much further than the Kentucky Act in regulating the individual contractual relationship between a principal and his
agent by forbidding any commissions unless there is a written agreement
between the purchaser and seller.'05 In Kentucky, agents need not disclose
the commission agreed upon between a principal and his agent to anyone
outside of that contractual relationship."° By maintaining confidentiality
of payments between a principal and agent, the Kentucky legislature preserved the rule that agents and principals may contract as they wish and
that such agreements will be kept private.
California and Kentucky are the only states with legislation that specifically addresses the practice of undisclosed dual agency in the sale of an
equine. Because only a handful of cases have been brought using section
19525, the impact of the California legislation remains to be seen.0 7 According to former California Attorney General John Van de Kamp, the impact of
the legislation has been positive and people within the horse industry are
now aware that they will face potentially large penalties for violating the
law. '8 Therefore, there is an argument to be made that although the legislation in California did not cause a "litigation explosion" that is not a measure
jockeys, drivers, apprentices, etc. must be licensed by the board. See id. § 19520.
ioi Id. § 1952 5

.

io2 Jess Jackson, Panel Discussion during the University of Kentucky CLE Equine Law

Seminar (Mar. 3-4, 2oo6) (electronic recording on file with author).
103 CAL. Bus. & PRO'; CODE § 19525 (West 2006).
1o4 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23u.357(4)(a)-(b) (West 2oo6). In 2005, the average price for a

thoroughbred horse sold at auction was approximately $54,985. See ThE JOCKEY CLUB, 2006
FACT BOOK 22 (2OO6) (calculated as gross sales of$1 ,239,290,425 divided by 20,720 horses sold).

A five percent commission on a $54,985 transaction equals approximately $2,749. Private sales
figures were unavailable. Judging from these figures, the average commission on the sale of a
thoroughbred is well above the $500.00 threshold set forth by the Act.
105 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 19525 (West 2006).
Io6 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 230.357(7), (8) (West 2oo6).
107 Letter from John K. Van de Kamp, former California Attorney General and former
President ofThoroughbred Owners of California, to Rep. Denver Butler, Chair, Licensing and
Occupation Committee, Kentucky General Assembly (Feb. 3, 2oo6) (on file with author).
io8 Id.

1010

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 95

of its success, and that the absence of such litigation is an indicator that the
law is an effective deterrent against this behavior.
B. Does the Act ProtectKentucky's Most Valued Industry?
Some describe undisclosed dual agency as a practice carried on by those
in the horse industry subculture, the "dark side" of the business that disrespects ethical practices." Although Kentucky common law" 0 and statutes"' provide a course of redress for a principal whose agent has participated in undisclosed dual agency, the Act creates what appears at first blush
to be a firm cause of action specifically relating to the sale of horses."' The
Act has three main requirements. First, every sale, purchase, or transfer
of a horse to be used for racing or showing must have a written bill of sale
signed by both parties or their duly authorized agents." 3 Second, if an agent
is to represent both the buyer and the seller in any transaction involving
the sale, purchase, or transfer of a horse, both the purchaser and the seller
must have prior knowledge of this arrangement and the agent must obtain
written consent from both." 4 Third, any payment made to an agent over
five hundred dollars related to the sale, purchase, or transfer of a horse used
for racing or showing from anyone other than the agent's principal must be
disclosed in writing to both the purchaser and the seller, and each principal
must consent to the payment in writing." '5 However, the Act does not apply6
to transactions under $10,000 when the horse is to be used for showing."
Additionally, the Act extends the remedies that were previously available
at common law, providing for recovery of treble damages, costs, expenses,
and attorneys fees." 7 The treble damages portion of recovery applies to
any undisclosed payment over five hundred dollars and to the difference
between the price paid for the horse and the actual value of the horse at
the time of sale.'

i09 See Patton & Meehan, supra note 2.
i io See Lloyd v.Colston & Moore, 68 Ky. (5 Bush) 587,588 (1869); Beasley v. Trontz, 677
S.W.zd 891, 894 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).
iii See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN § 506.040 (West 2oo6); id. § 518.ozo; id. § 518.030.
112 See generally id.§ 230.357.
113 In the case of a transaction solely for a season or interest in a stallion, the bill of sale
may be signed by the syndicate manager or stallion manager. In the case of an auction the
signature requirement is satisfied by an auction receipt and signature upon such receipt of the
purchase or purchaser's agent. Purchaser's agent must have a written authorization from his
principal in order to sign the auction receipt. See id. § 230.357(l)-(2).
114 Id. § 230.357(3).
115 Id. § 230.357(4).
i16 Id. § 230.357(9).
117 Id. § 230.357(6).
ii8 Id.
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The major defense that an agent could have advanced prior to the passing of this legislation is that undisclosed dual agency is customary in the
horse industry, 119 and therefore, the principal receives notice of these practices in advance. Under the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 388, an agent
may receive compensation from parties other than her principal without
violating her fiduciary duties if by custom an agreement to that effect is
found.' ° The Restatement also allows the custom defense in cases of undisclosed dual agency.'' While Kentucky already acknowledges that custom is not a defense to a violation of a statute or common law,' the Act
explicitly disallows this defense by making it illegal to accept payments
from anyone other than the agent's principal and to act as an agent for both
buyer and seller without the express written consent from both parties. 3
Kentucky case law 2 4 and statutes2 5 in existence prior to the Act established a solid cause of action against an agent who violated any of her fiduciary duties. The requirement that both parties consent to a dual agency
arrangement is present in the case law 2 6 as well as the Restatement.' 7 Hoge
v. Kentucky River Coal Co. states that payments received by an agent must
be given to his principal.2 " The rule mandating that a bill of sale be in
writing was already present in Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC),2 9 codified as KRS § 335.2-201(1), which requires that a contract for
the sale of goods over five hundred dollars must be in writing and signed
by the person "against whom the enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or broker."' 30 Horses fall within the purview of the UCC under
"goods."'' What then, is the function of the Act if its major features were
already present in Kentucky law?
i19 See

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 391 cmt. a (1958).

120 See id. § 388 cmt. b.
121 See id. § 391 cmt. a ("The terms of the employment may give a privilege to the agent
to act for adverse parties, and such terms may be shown by a prior course of dealing between
the principal and agent or by a custom of which the principal should be aware.").
122 "We would emphatically state, however, for the benefit of those engaged in such
practices, that where an 'accepted business practice' conflicts with existing law, the law
whether statutory or court ordered, is controlling." Marsh v. Gentry, 642 S.W.2d 574, 576 (Ky.
1982).

123 See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 230.357(3)-(4) (West 2006).
124 See Lloyd v. Colston & Moore, 68 Ky. (5 Bush) 587, 588 (1969); Chernick v. FasigTipton Kentucky, Inc., 703 S.W.2d 885 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986); Beasley v. Trontz, 677 S.W.zd 891,
984 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984); Hoge v. Ky. River Coal Corp., 287 SW. 226, 227 (Ky. Ct. App. 1926).
125 See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 518.O20 (West zoo6); id. § 518.030.
126 See Beasley, 677 S.W.2d at 894.
127 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 391 (1958).

128 See Hoge, 287 S.W. at 227.
129 See UCC § 2-2o1.
13o Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 355.2-201(1) (West 1958).

131 See generally Chernick v. Casares, 759 S.W.zd 832 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988).
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KRS § 230-357

A. Introductionto Economic Analysis of the Law
Economic analysis of laws "attempt[s] to explain legal rules and outcomes
as they are rather than to change them to make them better." 132 The base
assumption of all economic analysis is that every actor is a rational maximizer and will act. in his or her own best interests. 33 Thus, in analyzing a
specific legal rule, one must examine how a rational person acting in his
own self-interest would react to that rule and whether that outcome is socially desirable. One socially desirable goal for a legal rule is efficiency.
"The efficiency theory of the common law is best... explained as a system
for maximizing the wealth of society.' 134 This theory also extends to some
statutory law as well. 3 If the goal is to maximize social wealth, a socially
desirable6outcome occurs when the benefits to society exceed the costs to
1
society.
The sale of horses involves the transfer of property rights from one
party to another by contract. The Act creates certain legal constraints on
the contractual relationships involved in the sale of horses. Generally, free
transfer of property is socially desirable.' 37 There are, however, two main
reasons why it may be economically efficient to impose legal restraints on
sales: one, the sale creates externalities; and two, there is a lack of full information.' 3 This Note, focusing on the need for full information, asks two
questions about the economic effects of the Act. First, does this law help
to facilitate fully informed horse transactions, and thus, efficient outcomes?
Second, do the penalties imposed by the Act promote efficient conduct by
those involved in the horse industry?
B. The Act FacilitatesEconomic Efficiency for Kentuckians
The Act aids in the completion of fully informed horse transactions. In
order to have an efficient outcome in a horse sale, the benefits to the parties should outweigh the costs. Principal/agent relationships create efficiency and are often used in the horse industry. This relationship allows
people with expertise in a certain area to perform a task for a principal who
132 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 27 (5th ed. 1998).

133 "The concept of man as a rational maximizer of his self-interest implies that people
respond to incentives-that if a person's surroundings change in such a way that he could
increase his satisfactions by altering his behavior, he will do so." Id. at 4.
134 Id. at 27.
135 Id.

136 STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 15 (2004).
137 Id.at 12.
138 Id.
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would not have been able to complete the task in a quick and skilled manner. Therefore, the principal gains the benefit of an advisor with superior
knowledge of horses as well as access to industry insiders with relatively
low costs, a commission of five to ten percent.139 The agent gains her commission, which will be combined with others to make up her income, with
the relatively low costs of the use of her time and knowledge she already
possesses. An undisclosed dual agency relationship, however, creates a situation in which not all parties to the transaction are fully informed. Lack
of full knowledge creates inefficient bargains for several reasons." First,
the costs to the individual principal may be higher than the benefits he received from the agent's services, and the principal does not receive what he
bargained for. Second, undisclosed dual agency results in an industry-wide
cost because potential new investors are reluctant to invest in an enterprise
in which they could be defrauded."' The benefits received by the relative
few who receive undisclosed kickbacks are less than this overall industrywide cost, which ultimately impedes the growth of the industry.
The Act focuses on the problem of lack of information sharing between
the bargaining parties and mandates fully informed transactions. The Act
codifies that certain important information must be disclosed between an
agent and his principal in the sale of a horse. 14 It is clear from the case law
and trade magazines that full disclosure to principals by agents did not consistently occur on an industry-wide basis, despite already existing agency
law.' 43 The Act creates a situation in which full information and disclosure
is mandatory, thereby creating efficient bargains. Full disclosure between
agents and their principals is a socially desirable outcome because it encourages potential horse owners to invest in the industry by ensuring full
disclosure of dual agency. Full knowledge on the part of both contracting
parties is desirable because it facilitates the best possible outcomes from
agency relationships; the parties create an efficient bargain by using all the
information available.
The second issue is whether the penalties imposed by the act will promote efficient conduct on the part of the agents as self-interested actors.
Essentially, this inquiry rests on whether the treble damages, costs, and attorneys' fees imposed by the Act add costs to committing the violative acts
139 See

Havens, supra note 19, at 21.

140 See Louis KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, CONTRACTING 65-68 (2004).

141 In a discussion panel titled "Thoroughbred Industry Forum 2oo6," which was held
at Churchill Downs on November 3, 2oo6, Jess Jackson stated, "I've been at cocktail parties
with former heads of [Fortune 5001 companies, who ... told me they wouldn't come into the

industry because they got burnt." See Ryan Conley, Jackson Tells Forum He is Still Pushingfor
Reform, TiE BLOOD-HORSE, Nov. 3, 2oo6, availableat http://www.bloodhorse.com/articleindex/
article.asp?id=36zo4 (last visited Mar. 23, 2007) (alteration in original).
142 See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 230.357(3)-(5) (West zoo6).
143 See generally supra notes 2, 19-95 and accompanying text; Patton & Meehan, supra
note 2.
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that are sufficient to keep the violator from committing those acts. Violations will or will not occur based on an individual's calculation of the costs
144
and benefits of the violation, compared with alternative courses of action.
This is accomplished by examining the potential benefit from violating the
Act and comparing it with the expected fine, which equals the penalties
145
imposed multiplied by the probability that his actions will be detected.
If the costs to the agent exceed the benefits, he will not engage in the behavior. Theoretically, a fine should be adjusted upward as the probability of
the detection declines."4
As stated previously, disclosure of agency relationships and commissions
did not consistently occur in the horse industry. 147 Therefore, an agent who
engaged in such behaviors weighed the benefits of violating her fiduciary
duties against the expected fine and chose to engage in the illegal behavior.
This indicated that the penalty needed to be adjusted upward in order to
change a rational actor's balancing. The Act tips the scales in favor of not
committing the illegal act by imposing treble damages, costs, and attorneys'
fees for violations. 14 To a rational actor, the costs of violating the Act should
generally outweigh the benefits the agent receives from the undisclosed
commission, since the potential costs could be three times the gain realized
by the deception. Disclosure is relatively costless under the Act. It requires
the agent to obtain written consent from the purchaser and the seller and
that both have prior knowledge of the arrangement when dual agency exists.149 If the agent receives payments from anyone other than the agent's
principal, each principal for whom the agent is acting must provide written
consent, and the payment must be disclosed in writing.1i 0 Meanwhile, the
costs for violation are potentially very high,s' and any rational actor has an
incentive to abide by the Act's requirements.
An easy way to examine how the Act affects behavior and thus outcomes is to return to the Silver Horse hypothetical. The buyer employs
an agent to purchase Silver Horse at the lowest feasible price, while the
seller's agent has been employed to sell Silver the Horse at the highest
feasible price. If either of them agrees to take a commission or to represent

I44 C.f.DANIEL H. COLE & PETER Z. GROSSMAN, PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 276
(2005). Although this section deals specifically with criminal activity, it is closely analogous
with tortious activity. See id. at 272 ("A crime is simply a tort-a wrong-committed against both
the individual victim ... and the larger society.").
145 See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 81 (3d ed.

2003).

146 Id. at 81--8z.
I47 See supra note 143.
148 See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 230.357(6) (West 2006).
149 Id. § 230.357(3).
150 Id. § 230.357(4)151 See id. § 230.357(6).
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anyone other than their principal, they no longer have an incentive to act in
that principal's best interest. Long before the passage of the Act, this activity was illegal.' Before the passage of the Act, the agent was liable to his
principal only for his illegal gains,5 3 with slight chance of punitive damages
if fraud was proven.' However, this Act creates a counter-incentive against
this behavior by making the seller's agent and the buyer's agent liable to
their principals for the sum of three times their own gains, as well as costs
and attorney's fees. 5 As a result, both agents are less likely to violate their
fiduciary duties, and thus full disclosure is more likely. Consequently, when
Silver Horse sells for a fair price, the agents and principals have achieved
efficient bargaining. The penalties imposed by the Act change the calculation of a potential violator. It added costs to undisclosed dual agency and
secret kickbacks, ultimately creating a situation in which it would be economically inefficient in most cases to violate the Act.
C. The Act Addresses the Moral HazardProblem
The moral hazard problem manifests itself when, after a contract is made,
a party has an incentive to act in a way that is harmful to the other party
in the contract."s6 In this situation, after the initial contracting is complete,
"the promisee has more to gain from breach than from performance...
,,1s7 For example, once people are insured, they are less likely to take precautions to prevent losses, resulting in higher insurance premiums.'58 The
moral hazard problem can cause economic inefficiency when incentives
59
One solution to the problem is
change in a way that can hurt both parties."
6
access to information," for if the parties know of the change in incentives,
they may alter the contract to address the problem. However, obtaining
the information needed to combat the problem is sometimes difficult because of the financial costs of obtaining information. 6'
The moral hazard problem can also manifest itself in an agency relationship. Most agency relationships in the horse business are performancebased contracts where "payment depends on productivity as measured by

152 See Hoge v. Ky. River Coal Corp, 287 S.W. 226, 228 (Ky. 1926).
153 Id. at 227.

154 For the type of egregious acts that are required before punitive damages are awarded,
see Chernick v. Fasig-Tipton Ky., Inc., 703 S.W.2d 885, 888-89 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).
155 See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 230.357(6) (West 2006).
156 KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supranote 140, at 57.
157 POSNER,

i58
159
16o
161

supra note 132, at 143.

KAPLOW & SHAVELL, SUpra note 140, at 56-57.

Id. at 57.
Id. at 58.
Id. at 59.
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some specified criterion."16 The buyer and the buyer's agent have an initial
agency contract that provides that the agent will receive a percentage of
the purchase price of Silver Horse. The contractual relationship between
the buyer and the his agent shapes the agent's incentives. Under Kentucky
agency law prior to the passage of the Act, 163 the buyer's agent had more
incentive to breach his fiduciary duties to his principal and obtain undisclosed kickbacks from the seller's agent or the seller for several reasons. Before the Act, agency law in Kentucky consisted of a amalgamation of case
law, Restatement (Second) of Agency sections, and criminal statutes,"6 which
thus worked in favor of the buyer's agent. The fractured law was a potential
disincentive to a plaintiff. In addition, the damages the buyer's agent was
potentially liable for were limited. 16s The Act changes what the incentives
of the buyer's agent are post-contract. First, it pertains specifically to the
agent's behavior of failing to disclose dual agency in the sale of a horse."6
Second, it provides a clear cause of action and allows for recovery of damages much higher than was available to a plaintiff previously. 67 Therefore,
the Act decreases the chance that the buyer's agent will have more to gain
from breaching his contract with the buyer than he will by performance of
the contract.
The Act also facilitates access to information for principals, so that if
an incentive does change for his agent, the principal will be aware of the
change and can change the terms of the contract accordingly. Those provisions in the Act which require an agent to disclose dual agency relationships as well as any payments received' 68 is in part a codification of Restatement (Second) of Agency § 381, which pertains to an agent's duty to disclose
all information to his principal which is relevant to his principal's affairs and
which the principal would desire to have.169 Therefore, the Act decreases
the costs of obtaining information for principals and decreases the incentive to break a contract that is endemic in the moral hazard problem.
D. PotentialShortcomings of the Act
The Act does have two possible problems, the first of which is that the
statute states that "[nlo person shall be held liable under this section unless
that person has actual knowledge of the conduct constituting a violation of

16z Id. at

26-27.

163 See generally supranotes 19-95 and accompanying text.
164 See generally supra notes 19-95 and accompanying text.
165 See generally Hoge v. Ky. River Coal Corp., 287 S.W. 226, 227 (Ky. 1926).
166 See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 230.357(3) (West 2OO6).
167 See id. § 230.357(6).
168 See id. § 230-357(3)-(4), (6).
169 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 381 (1958).
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this section."' 170 Such a high scienter requirement could create major evidentiary roadblocks for a plaintiff alleging a cause of action under this statute, since actual knowledge is an elevated culpability standard. Second, the
damages portion provides that the plaintiff shall receive "[tihe difference.
..between the price paid for the equine and the actual value of the equine
at the time of sale,"' 7 and the nature of the horse business is such that the
actual value of a horse is difficult to determine. The value of a horse is what
a willing buyer is will pay a willing seller on any given day. For example, at
the Fasig-Tipton Fall Yearling Sale in 2006, a man bought a filly for $29,000
before the horse went into the auction and sold it at auction for $270,000
less than twenty-four hours later. 7 ' Clearly, ascertaining the "actual value"
of the horse could prove to be quite difficult. The Act is untested in Kentucky courts as of the writing of this Note, but the development of case
law will reveal whether the high scienter requirement and the valuation
requirements prove to be problematic for plaintiffs.
IV. CONCLUSION

KRS § 230.0357 does not contain novel concepts in the area of agency law.
Rather, it serves to address the specific problems within the horse industry of undisclosed dual agency and undisclosed kickback payments. The
general concepts of disclosure and the fiduciary duties owed to a principal
are present as they have been in Kentucky law for over one hundred years.
73
However, several aspects of the Act could cause a change in the industry.
First, by requiring written consent to dual agency and kickbacks, the Act
lessens the plaintiff's evidentiary burden to show a lack of consent. Second, by making undisclosed dual agency per se illegal, the Act no longer
permits custom as a valid defense. Finally, by providing relief in the form
of treble damages, costs, and attorneys' fees, the Act adds costs to violations
which should lead to a rational actor to refrain from the activity. Overall, the
Act is economically efficient and maximizes social welfare by facilitating
trade based on full information and thus, creating a more efficient market
place for horse sales.
Kentucky courts have called the horse business the "Commonwealth's
most prestigious and valued industry" with an "international reputation for

17o Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 230.35700) (West 2006) (emphasis added).
171 Id. § 230.357(6)(a).
17z See Ray Paulick, Filly Sold Before Fasig-Tipton Sale Should have been Scratched,111E
BLOOD-HORSE, Oct. 26, 2oo6.

173 Some people are skeptical about the effects of this legislation on the horse business.
Jim Squires, owner of Two Bucks farm, stated, "No matter what law they write or how good
it is, the people who do this will find a loophole to do this, just the way tax evaders find a
loophole in the tax code." See Patton & Meehan, supra note 2.
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excellence."' 74 Kentucky courts, and now the Kentucky legislature, have
acknowledged a clear public policy interest in protecting this most valued industry and attracting new buyers who will contribute wealth to the
business. The Act specifically addresses the problems of undisclosed dual
agency and undisclosed payments in the sale of horses by creating a clear
cause of action for principals whose agents have violated their fiduciary
duties. The requirement that consent to dual agency and commissions be
in writing, along with the additional penalties imposed for violation of the
Act, should result in a positive change.

174 Chernick v. Fasig-Tipton Ky., Inc., 703 S.W-2d 885,890 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).

